We propose and demonstrate that the recruitment of talent from society into the regime represents a novel and significant consequence of state power expansion.

This paper investigates the non-parametric identification of matching games and applies this framework to the analysis of matching mechanism design in government recruitment.

In a firm with multiple hierarchical levels, we find that managers are incentivized to engage in talent hoarding. While managerial bonuses and job rotation policies may prevent talent hoarding, the existence of a subset of more visible workers could increase the likelihood of talent hoarding.

We identify that in team production settings, peer performances increase as they are exposed over time to superstars, indicating a positive dynamic spillover effect. Moreover, these spillovers are observed in the skill dimensions of peers that complement those of the superstars.

We find that job seekers perceive a decrease of 18% in their subjective job-finding probability for each additional month of unemployment. However, job seekers perceive a higher job-finding probability when the aggregate unemployment rate is lower than they expected.

We find that misconceptions regarding financial rewards and career advancement prospects are widespread among college students in China. These misperceptions vary among students with different characteristics, such as ability and pro-social preferences, significantly influencing their career decisions.

We propose and estimate a dynamic game model to examine the welfare implications of decentralized versus centralized decision-making in formulating mitigation policies during the COVID-19 pandemic.